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Corruption has its own motivations, and one has to thoroughly study that phenomenon and eliminate the foundations that allow corruption to exist.
-Eduard Shevardnadze
The prospect of China overtaking the United States hangs over American society Most military affairs analysts as well as Western intelligence agencies grossly underestimated the speed at which China is financially committed to this modernization. The People's Liberation Army (PLA)'s formal defense budget now sits at just over $106 billion dollars which represents a four-fold increase in defense spending over the last decade.
1 While America and its allies were fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, China was investing in its military. More defense money means more than just better military hardware. Very large amounts of money infused into an organization that is not accustomed to handling these volumes can lay the foundation for corrupt business practices. This is what has happened in China and specifically within the PLA. Concern over China's deployment of its first aircraft carrier, for example, needs to be tempered by the same level of concern that rampant and systemic corruption is destroying the PLA from the inside. This paper attempts to explain the depth, breadth, and maturity of corruption in the PLA. It will examine the origins of this contemporary corruption, the steps taken by the Chinese government to combat corruption, and the future prospects for the PLA as a guarantor of China's role as a global power.
China's Market Reforms
The maturing of corruption in China, both in the PLA and the countrywide, stems from several factors. Corruption, as a societal factor, is not unique to China or any other country. At a national level corruption can be found in every country from the Vatican to India. Nor is corruption the privy of certain forms of government or ideologies.
Capitalism and Marxism, for example, both afford the individual acting alone or in a group, the opportunity to benefit from graft and corrupt practices. Corruption is always a possibility since the most important element in corrupt behavior is the role of the individual. Human beings possess free will which is the ability to do what society considers wrong in spite of being able to distinguish the difference between right and wrong. In 2010, President Hu Jintao stated that China must refocus its anticorruption efforts to address both the symptoms as well as the root causes of corruption.
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The introduction of market reforms and the growth of China's import/export market have allowed China to experience rapid economic growth for the past 30 years.
This growth has been accompanied by the rapid explosion of foreign ideas that came initially from foreign contact and later through the information revolution via the Internet.
These social processes are not confined to the economic sphere. As the senior Chinese leadership continues to discover, the ability to stem the flow of foreign ideas into select channels of Chinese society is proving to be an impossible task. Military pay has also not kept up with civilian pay for commensurate jobs given China's dazzling economic growth. While it is true that the PLA was able to rid itself of thousands of consumer businesses there were already signs that the PLA was not become less corrupt but more mature in its business and marketing plans. As previously stated, the PLA was successful in divesting itself from the lion's share of the consumer businesses which it had owned prior to 1998. Less apparent were the cloaked re-designations of some of the businesses from outright PLA ownership to a more nuanced ownership structure where PLA officers used family members to serve as chief operating officers and chief financial officers for these same businesses. This "reflagging" of PLA businesses allowed the PLA to retain a financial toehold in the marketplace while reducing its public image as a major force in the consumer economy of China.
The second post-surge aspect of corruption in the PLA saw the maturity and growth of PLA involvement in larger scale commercial enterprises such as land speculation, mineral rights acquisitions, and joint foreign venture enterprises. 
PLA Corruption in Procurement
As lucrative as land speculation could be for a PLA general officer it was in the realm of PLA procurements where corruption on a global scale came to blossom within the last decade. In order to understand the flourishing of corruption in the PLA's procurement system, it is necessary to go back in time to examine PLA procurement practices and how they evolved over the last 20 years.
Prior to Deng's rule in the 1980s the PLA received the bulk of its military hardware from state owned enterprises that generally produced higher priced and lower quality items for all of the services within the PLA (The Chinese Army, Navy, and Air
Force are all under the PLA organizational umbrella which accounts for names of these services: People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)). Under this system the majority of the PLA's needs ranging from foodstuff to missiles were procured through a rigid, centralized system under the purview of the GLD. Even today, the GLD is the ultimate authority and director for PLA procurements.
By the end of the Deng years, the PLA had begun to diversify its buying habits.
Just as more leeway and latitude were permitted in the growing private sector, so too did the PLA begin to allow military units, at the local level, an increasing degree of independence when it came to some procurements. PLA units at the tactical level were given ever increasing procurement authority over foodstuffs, utilities, fuel, and some real estate. The GLD retained major hardware procurement authority to itself at the national The adoption of A2/AD as a defense strategy has allowed the PLA to justify its personnel downsizing while greatly expanding the volume of military expenditures needed to sustain these A2/AD capabilities. In addition to the weapons systems themselves, the PLA has also found that these military capabilities require a long logistics and sustainment tail that in some cases is as expensive as the weapons systems they are tied into.
Over the last decade the PLA, largely through the GLD, has discovered just how expensive both the acquisition and sustainment of these modern systems has proven to be. China's military budget has experienced nearly two decades of double-digit growth.
The PLA's drive to acquire systems such as fourth/fifth generation fighters with advanced avionics, for instance, has mandated that entirely new acquisition and maintenance models be adopted and put in place. Because the majority of the most sophisticated components for these new systems are acquired outside of China, a modern procurement network is necessary in order to feed the acquisition timeline that the PLA has set forth it its own force modernization strategic plan. The fusing of indigenous with foreign components has created an elongated acquisition network which lends itself to graft and corruption at multiple points along the way. Integrating While it is difficult to discern given the PLA's lack of transparency, a fair estimate of PLA procurement costs for these newer weapons systems show that they account for nearly 1/3 of the annual PLA budget.
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From 2009 onward, the GLD has paid special attention to investigating PLA officers involved in maintenance contracts. These contracts are complex and generally involve high levels of foreign production dependency. The myriad of component acquisition programs for one weapon system alone, for example, makes it extremely difficult to track and monitor these contracts. Thorough investigations are proving to be nearly impossible for the under-staffed and under-resourced organizations responsible for conducting corruption investigations.
Results of Anti-Corruption Efforts
A cursory view of current corruption in the PLA might leave one to believe that their efforts are rather hopeless given the ever-growing volumes of money and scale of commercial enterprises. The GLD's anti-corruption track record is not all bleak. When the PLA entered the consumer business market in the early 1990s it was not 14 uncommon for lower-level military units to contract out their needs to local businesses.
This latitude allowed local PLA commanders to seek out local suppliers for their needs.
A contract was agreed upon and money was exchanged. There was very little accountability in this system. This system was not only corrupt but horribly inefficient since local commanders often did not always inform their chain of command of the details of these commercial transactions. In addition, it was not uncommon for units in adjoining military regions to purchase the same item or service (sometimes from the same provider) for vastly different amounts of money.
By the late 1990s this lack of oversight came to characterize the national posture regarding corruption in general. It was not until the PLA's divestiture of the majority of their small-scale consumer businesses that proper oversight efforts were initiated. In 2009, the Ministry of National Defense instituted a new system for purchasing weapons that would ensure all deals were transparent and provided value for money. 12 The PLA also instituted a series of organizational reforms aimed at streamlining the acquisition system while strengthening the GLD's oversight responsibilities. The standardization of contracts, a formal review process, and centralized competitive bidding brought about the demise of large-scale corruption at the lower levels of the PLA officer corps.
Fighting corruption has often been compared to fighting unemployment. You can never solve the problem and arrive at zero unemployment or zero corruption. As was mentioned earlier, the historical approach has been to improve upon the situation at hand and make corruption insignificant to the overall success of the organization. For the PLA to succeed in its anti-corruption campaign it must concentrate less on prosecuting wrongdoers and more on creating the conditions where corrupt behavior is 15 not rewarded or expected by the senior national leadership. Corruption is so deeply rooted in China's fast-paced economy that it is difficult to discern if things are improving.
It is clear in China that corruption is part of the marketization process that goes back to the 1980s. The GLD, as the procurement and primary real estate driver of the PLA, has been characterized in the last few years as the proverbial fox watching the henhouse.
General Liu is aware that he is up against some powerful and formidable foes. So far, General Liu has vowed to fight corruption no matter how high up that individual may be in the national hierarchy. 15 Other Factors Complicating China's Corruption Problem China's rise as a global economic and political power will continue to the subject of continued study in the years to come. China's rise as a military power will continue to be debated as well as China seeks to establish itself as a regional hegemon in East
Asia. The PLA is on a fairly tight timeline out to 2030 to establish itself as the dominant regional military power. It is paramount for China to continue to modernize the PLA as it seeks to mold it into an effective fighting force that can safeguard both China's 16 independence and ensure internal stability for centuries to come. China's future is best characterized with two opposing drivers: ever increasing military capabilities and ever increasing societal pressures.
The clock is ticking for China. The unprecedented economic growth of the last two decades will not last forever. As long as this positive economic growth continues then China's ability to pay for military modernization will be unaffected. Under this economic forecast, the PLA can achieve effective A2/AD military capabilities that allow it to assume the role of regional hegemon. It will be able to acquire the hardware and supporting mission command structure to effectively negate U.S. and allied efforts to engage China on its periphery. If China's economic growth does not continue at its current pace or slows in the outlying years, then the PLA will find itself under ever increasing fiscal constraints as it competes with other government programs/services.
The disturbing demographic trends, however, do paint a much bleaker picture beyond 2050. 16 The greying of China's population means that China's "one-child" policy will place China in the same position that Japan is now facing. With fewer children being born China is going to approach a "4-2-1" model when a much smaller workforce will have to financially support an ever increasing ratio of parents and grandparents.
Even if China suddenly changed its "one child" policy it would take generations for this effect to reverse the projected changes in workforce population. China's restrictive immigration policies and lack of transparency in all facets of government operations coupled with the "one-child "policy means that China must modernize the PLA to a sufficient level by 2030 at the latest. Within the last year the Chinese government reaffirmed the "one-child" policy and upheld restrictive immigration policies,
The working age population in China will start declining starting in 2015 meaning that China will begin to lose its share of the unskilled/semi-skilled workforce. 17 This decline, coupled with the growth of these same labor markets in India and Vietnam, will likely slow Chinese economic growth.
Conclusion
Can the PLA achieve sufficient force modernization before China's economic 
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The PLA has taken some baby steps within the past few years to improve on certain aspects of financial accountability for military officers. As of June 2012, PLA officers above the regimental level are now required to report their incomes, real estate assets, and investment information. In addition, the National Defense University recently opened a research institute in November 2011 that is exclusively focused on corruption. 18 These efforts plus new regulations adopted in June 2011 hold some promise for the PLA's fight against corruption. The challenge for the princeling leaders, Gen Liu Yuan and Xi Jinping, are to bring corruption under control where it no longer undermines the authority of the PLA or the CCP.
The PLA runs the risk of becoming an organization whose values do not match those of the nation it serves. It will have become a modern, well-equipped gang whose leadership has no moral compass. Without a soul, the PLA will come to resemble a large, effective, criminal organization that will be impotent and unable to effect mission control for PLA military operations.
With all the challenges that corruption brings, estimates of China's inevitable rise to superpower status rivaling the United States must be tempered. China and, in particular, the PLA both deserve our attention and focus as America rebalances to AsiaPacific. We must also guard against developing a myopic view of China. Our relations with China must be viewed in a regional context which accounts for China's goals and ambitions regarding territorial disputes, internal stability, and global economic competition. As global competitors we need to improve communications between our military forces and increase the depth and range of opportunities where we can constructively work together in areas of mutual concern. The PLA, for its part, must
